The Kremlin’s regional policy – a year of dismissing governors. OSW Commentary NUMBER 257 | 15.12.2017 by Domańska, Maria
1www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 257
NUMBER 257 | 15.12.2017
Maria Domańska
2017 has seen a wave of dismissals of the heads of Russia’s regions – the largest in the past 
five years. This is linked primarily to the Kremlin’s preparations for the presidential election. 
Personnel changes are among the few instruments the government has at its disposal to 
improve public support, given the dysfunctional governance model, growing dissatisfaction 
among the Russian public and the government team’s unwillingness to launch reforms. 
Even though it would appear that there is no single consistent algorithm for reshuffles on 
the level of governors (each decision to dismiss and nominate a governor has been consid-
ered separately), still the criteria that were taken into account in the first place included the 
socio-economic situation in the region, the degree of tension inside the regional elite, and 
public support for the incumbent governor. The Kremlin’s inability to formulate an appealing 
and credible election manifesto has been masked by a partial rejuvenation of the regional 
government staff and a temporary neutralisation of tension in some of the regions. Thus the 
staff ‘face-lift’ ahead of the election is aimed predominantly at building a positive image; 
the main goal is to give hope to the public, at least temporarily, of positive changes. 
The position of governors in the Russian government system has been gradually diminishing. 
Their competences and status have been consistently reduced as part of the process of in-
creasing the centralisation of power in Russia. The logic of the personnel changes carried out 
in 2017 proves that the status of the governor’s office has been finally downgraded and depo-
liticised: the newly appointed governors are in fact middle managers and representatives of the 
nomenklatura delegated from the centre and at the full disposal of the central government. 
The position of governors in the Russian 
political system
A formalised, transparent federal system reg-
ulated by consistent laws has never been de-
veloped in the Russian Federation. Relations 
between the centre and the regions (formally: 
federal subjects) have been going through the 
process of formation since the beginning, to 
a great extent in the ‘manual steering’ mode 
determined by personal relations between the 
president of the state and the heads of the 
regions (governors), including the lobbying 
potential of the latter. The process as part of 
which regions were becoming increasingly in-
dependent from the federal government in the 
1990s put the state’s integrity at stake and gave 
rise to attempts to maximise the centralisation 
of power and to tighten control of the political 
sphere; and these attempts have been success-
ful throughout the Putin epoch. The gradual 
lowering of the governors’ status since 2000 fits 
in with these moves. 
Their role in the system has been reduced in two 
ways. Firstly, the budget and tax reforms con-
ducted in the first year of Putin’s rule resulted 
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in a significant curb on the governors’ autono-
my as regards influencing the economic situa-
tion of the territories they were in charge of1 – 
a redistribution model has become entrenched 
in Russia where most of the regions’ revenues 
from taxes and other fees are transferred to the 
federal budget and then they are redistributed 
among the regions, often in a non-transpar-
ent manner. This system has a demotivating 
effect on the local governments, discouraging 
them from improving their regions’ attractive-
ness to investors. Governors, whose role has 
practically speaking been limited to technical 
management, are in turn forced to engage in 
constant financial lobbying, and thus play the 
role of supplicants in contacts with Moscow. 
This has the most detrimental effect on the 
richest regions – their financial dependence is 
viewed by Moscow as a guarantee of the po-
litical loyalty of the local elites. Furthermore, 
regional budgets are quite often burdened 
with additional tasks without being offered 
adequate transfers from the central budget, 
and the responsibility for carrying out the task, 
including ensuring social stability, is each time 
delegated to the local governments. 
1 For more details see: J. Rogoża, Federation without fed-
eralism. Relations between Moscow and the regions, 
OSW Studies, April 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/
default/files/ang_prace_49_federacja_bez_net.pdf
Secondly, the social legitimacy of governors 
has been consistently undermined under 
Putin’s rule. The terrorist attack in Beslan in 
2004 was used as a pretext to abolish elections 
for governors (introduced in Russia in 1995). 
Starting from 2005 governors were appoint-
ed by regional parliaments upon a presidential 
motion. The reinstatement of elections as part 
of neutralisation of protest sentiments after 
the demonstrations in 2011–20122 has not re-
built their significance as an institution based 
on political competition; they have become 
a rather predictable ritual. A number of formal 
and informal mechanisms limiting or even pre-
venting competition have been built around 
elections for governors, such as the municipal 
filter3 or, what has already become a standard, 
support from ‘administrative resources’ (legal 
and illegal assistance from the local govern-
ments in financing and conducting the election 
campaign) offered to candidates of the ‘party 
of power’, United Russia. 
Decisions to dismiss or appoint governors are 
in fact taken by the president alone, often on 
purely subjective grounds. They are the result 
of recommendations from the domestic policy 
unit of the Presidential Administration, lobby-
ing from interest groups linked to the Kremlin 
and the personal preferences of the head of 
state. The president nominates acting heads of 
the regions who then formally legitimise their 
mandate by taking part in non-competitive and
2 Neither the regional elites nor the public supported 
the formula of nominating governors. According to the 
public opinion polls conducted in 2005 – 2012, 60–65% 
of respondents wanted direct elections reinstated. 
K. Рогов, Избранные жертвы: что означают массовые 
замены губернаторов, https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/
politics/06/10/2017/59d729fb9a79477e10dd12e7
3 The municipal filter means that a candidate seeking reg-
istration must receive between 5% and 10% of signa-
tures of councillors in three quarters of the municipal 
constituencies of a given region; in fact, given the domi-
nation of the ‘party of power’ in regional and local state 
administration, it is impossible to receive the signatures 
without prior acceptance of the candidate by the Krem-
lin. This was clearly visible, for example, during the most 
recent regional election (September 2017).
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often manipulated or rigged elections4. However, 
the public mandate achieved in this way does not 
protect them from being dismissed – the right 
to dismiss governors is statutorily vested in the 
president of the Federation (the regulations grant 
very extensive competences to the president in 
this area), as is the right to nominate acting gov-
ernors. The president’s decisions do not necessar-
ily have much in common with voter sentiment, 
one proof of which is the fact that governors 
with low public support often keep their position 
for years, as long as they are capable of ensur-
ing desirable electoral results for the ‘party of 
power’. The president’s statutory competences 
are reinforced with unofficial mechanisms of the 
functioning of the government model (including 
the Kremlin’s unrestricted possibilities to use the 
secret services for political purposes). As a rule 
the formal reason for a dismissal is ‘resignation’ 
(then the official may count on remaining part 
of the government system) or ‘loss of the presi-
dent’s trust’ – for example, in those cases where 
the dismissal is linked to an especially widely pub-
licised corruption scandal. 
The logic of staffing decisions A.D. 2017
In Russia the representatives of regional and lo-
cal governments of various levels whose term 
ends in a given year are elected on the ‘joint 
election day’ (this day is set every year for Sep-
tember) . This means that governors’ dismissals 
usually take place in spring or autumn. This way 
their acting successors have enough time to 
adequately prepare their election campaign for 
the upcoming regional election in which they 
are expected to gain the formal public mandate 
to perform the function. 
4 The only incumbent governor to have beaten the Kremlin’s 
candidate in elections is the head of Irkutsk Oblast, the 
Communist, Sergey Levchenko. If an incumbent governor 
runs for a subsequent term in office, the routine practice 
is the following: if he or she may count on the president’s 
support, they resign before the end of the current term 
and thus put themselves at the president’s disposal. Then 
the president entrusts the ex-governor to temporarily per-
form the duties of governor until the time of the election. 
This signifies the president’s full support to the candidate. 
This practice is further proof that the real source of legiti-
mising formally elected bodies is in the Kremlin. 
The range of the two waves of dismissals in 
2017 (February-April and September-October) 
was the largest in the past five years: nineteen 
governors were replaced. Under Putin’s rule re-
shuffles on a similar scale were only seen in 2010 
(also nineteen replacements) and 2012 (twenty). 
The reshuffles in February affected the gover-
nors whose five-year terms in office would have 
ended in 2017 anyway, and thus the decisions 
in their cases were linked to the election calen-
dar5, while the term in office of most of those 
dismissed in autumn might have lasted a few 
more years6. There were two special dismissals 
in April, also in the middle of a term: the governors 
of Mari-El Republic and Udmurtia lost their posi-
tions and were arrested on corruption charges. 
These dismissals were not so routine in their 
nature, but they rather proved that the Presi-
dential Administration was searching for the 
right staff replacement formula ahead of the 
presidential election. While the logic of gover-
nors’ dismissals was based to a great extent on 
a few objectivised criteria7, it is rather difficult 
to notice a clearly prevalent trend in the new 
nominations. It is worth noting the Kremlin’s 
will to leave the dismissed governors (with 
5 The dismissals affected the governors of: Perm Krai, Bury-
atia, Karelia, Novgorod Oblast and Ryazan Oblast (before 
that, in January, the head of Adygea was replaced). 
6 The dismissals affected the governors of: Samara Oblast, 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Dagestan, 
the Nenets Autonomous District, Primorsky Krai, Pskov 
Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast 
and Ivanovo Oblast. 
7 Unofficially, these included: an evaluation of the socio-eco-
nomic situation in the region, the degree of tension in the 
regional elite, the level of corruption among the elite and 
public support for the governor (reflecting also the po-
tential of dissatisfaction and protest sentiments), http://
www.mk.ru/politics/2017/09/30/nazvany-kriterii-otsta-
vok-gubernatorov--v-rossii.html; https://www.gazeta.ru/
politics/2017/02/06_a_10512575.shtml#page1
‘Outsiders’ and ‘technocrats’ without 
a political base tend to predominate 
among the new governors. Their position 
depends not on a public mandate but on 
the president’s arbitrary decisions. 
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a few exceptions) in the government system by 
co-opting them into federal or regional govern-
ment structures8.
The overriding criterion in the case of both re-
shuffles was the ‘problematic’ situation in the 
regions that might become a challenge to the 
government in the context of the presidential 
election. Although the election result is abso-
lutely predictable, the incumbent president en-
joys a high level of public support and the en-
tire state administration will be put into a state 
of maximum mobilisation, for Vladimir Putin 
it is the style of his victory that will be most 
important. Given this situation, conflicts inside 
local elites, protest sentiments among the pub-
lic, and corruption scandals may not only make 
the election machinery less efficient but may 
also indirectly adversely affect the president’s 
image in the eyes of regional communities. 
The dismissed governors were inefficient ac-
cording to the expert rankings prepared for the 
needs of the Presidential Administration. It was 
mainly due to: their lack of skill in preventing 
conflicts inside local elites (the degree of con-
solidation of the elite on the regional level is 
one of the key factors of the stabilisation of the 
situation in the context of the presidential elec-
tion), corruption scandals inside regional gov-
ernment circles, and their inability to bring pub-
lic sentiment under control. One example of the 
latter was the situation in Novosibirsk Oblast, 
where the governor’s position was shaken part-
ly due to a conflict over a rise in utility charges 
caused by him. The economic situation of a giv-
en region seemed to have the least influence 
on the staffing decisions. 
The logic of choosing new heads of the regions 
is less obvious. Much depends on the candi-
8 President Putin met with both groups of the dismissed gov-
ernors. He assured them that they might expect new po-
sitions and appealed to them to support their successors. 
Amongst the new nominations so far granted are those to: 
the former head of Buryatia (he currently serves as a rep-
resentative of Buryatia in the Federation Council) and the 
former governors of the following oblasts: Oryol (deputy 
presidential plenipotentiary representative in the Central 
Federal District), Samara (special presidential representative 
for relations with the World Congress of the Finno-Ugric 
Peoples) and Novosibirsk (advisor to the presidential pleni-
potentiary representative in the Siberian Federal District). 
date’s ‘managerial’ skills, the special character-
istics of a given region, the balance of power 
inside the local elite and also the result of lob-
bying by the individual interest groups among 
which the domestic policy unit of the Presi-
dential Administration is only one of the play-
ers (the others include the federal ministries, 
regional governments, financial and industrial 
groups and secret services)9. Putin’s attitude 
to a given candidate is also very important. 
Nevertheless, three main tendencies can be 
distinguished in the logic of the nominations. 
Firstly, few of the newly nominated governors 
originate from the regions they took charge of 
(only three out of the eleven governors nomi-
nated in the autumn). This is a continuation of 
the trend visible throughout Putin’s third pres-
idency – the share of ‘aliens’ has increased to 
64%, while during the presidency of Medvedev 
it was 48%10. It is proof of local groups of in-
fluence losing the Kremlin’s trust. On the one 
hand it provokes their dissatisfaction11 while on 
the other, it might result in the improvement of 
the government’s public perception (the ‘aliens’ 
9 It has been pointed out, for example, that Sergey 
Chemezov, the CEO of Rostec, might have lobbied for 
candidates from the Ministry of Industry and Trade; 
the mayor of Moscow, Sergey Sobyanin, backed the in-
cumbent governor of Perm Krai, and Sergey Kiriyenko 
helped his former associate from Rosatom become the 
head of Primorsky Krai.
10 www.rbc.ru/politics/16/10/2017/59de58a99a79474f-
1855c9d0?from=newsfeed
11 One sign of this is, for example, the dissatisfaction of 
the elites in Novosibirsk Oblast for whom the nomina-
tion of Andrei Travnikov for acting governor in October 
2017 came as a complete surprise and caused dismay. 
Not only is he an outsider in a region which has a rela-
tively strong local identity, but also the functions he has 
held so far do not make him a political player (mayor 
of Vologda, before that he held medium-level positions 
in the metallurgical corporation Severstal).
The overriding criterion in the case of the 
personnel changes in 2017 was the ‘prob-
lematic’ situation in some regions that 
might become a challenge to the govern-
ment in the context of the presidential 
election. 
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are not linked to the disgraced local clans in-
volved in corruption scandals). The new gov-
ernor of Dagestan stands out especially clearly 
against this background – he is the first gov-
ernor who not only originates from outside 
the region but also has nothing in common 
with the main ethnic groups inhabiting the re-
public (Vladimir Vasilyev is of Kazakh-Russian 
ethnic background). Secondly, the governor 
corps has become somewhat younger owing 
to the changes (the average age was reduced 
from 55 in 2013 to 46 in 2017), but this is not 
a sensation in the history of the Russian Fed-
eration (in 2001 the average age was 40.9)12. 
Thirdly, many of the newly nominated gover-
nors are ‘technocrats’ – former high- or medi-
um-level officials in the structures of the fed-
eral government, regional government or large 
corporations (including deputy ministers for 
economic development, the deputy minister 
for industry and trade, the general director of 
Rosmorport company, and a department head 
at the office of the mayor of Moscow). 
These tendencies prove that the status of the 
governor’s office has been finally downgraded 
and depoliticised. The newly appointed gov-
ernors are in fact middle managers and repre-
sentatives of the nomenklatura delegated from 
the centre and at the full disposal of the central 
government. Even the nominations of repre-
sentatives of the ‘political’ sphere fit in with this 
scheme (they include the parliamentary speaker 
in Krasnoyarsk Krai, the mayors of Samara and 
Vologda, the head of the United Russia faction 
in the State Duma, and high-ranking repre-
sentatives of the parliamentary opposition – 
the Communist Party and A Just Russia). 
12 www.rbc.ru/politics/16/10/2017/59de58a99a79474f-
1855c9d0?from=newsfeed
The possible consequences 
of the personnel changes
The reshuffle is mainly a PR move; it is not aimed 
at improving regional government’s effective-
ness in the socio-economic sphere but rather 
(at least for a short time) increasing public confi-
dence in the government and President Putin in 
the period preceding the election scheduled for 
March – owing to the removal of the most ‘prob-
lematic’ governors. Their successors are given 
’a honeymoon period’ from the voters (in the 
hope for change). However, none of the key re-
gional problems are likely to be resolved, such as 
the impoverishment of society, a shrinking tax 
base, the need to continue the painful welfare 
cuts, including access to medical care, and infra-
structural problems. These problems are not so 
much an effect of the special conditions existing 
in the regions or erroneous staffing decisions, 
corrected through reshuffles, but rather of the 
systemic dysfunction of the excessively regulat-
ed, bureaucratised and corrupt Russian state13.
Thus the political risks to the regime will continue 
to exist. One consequence of the increasing dif-
ficulties is growing public dissatisfaction in the 
regions in 2017 in connection with problems in 
such areas as social services, housing, transport 
and employment14. The only positive effect the 
staff replacements may have could be the tem-
porary improvement of the effectiveness of gov-
ernance in the regions as a result of streamlining 
bureaucracy – this is one of those few spheres on 
which regional heads still have a real influence. 
The personnel changes are also unlikely to neu-
tralise the growing friction between the centre 
of the federation and the regions over finan-
cial issues; over the past year there has been 
an escalation in the dispute over the principles 
of the redistribution of funds between the eco-
nomically differentiated regions, given the fact 
that revenues to the federal budget have fallen 
13 For more information see: M. Domańska, ‘Crisis in Rus-
sia. Degradation of the model of economic governance,’ 
OSW Studies, March 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/prace_61_ang_crisis-in-russia_net.pdf 
14 h t t p s : / / w w w . r b c . r u / p o l i t i c s / 3 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 17 /
59f7a4329a79476ddc21a2df
The reshuffles will not resolve the region-
al problems nor will they neutralise the 
growing friction between the federal cen-
tre and the regions over financial issues. 
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over the past few years due to low oil prices. The 
mayor of Moscow, the president of Tatarstan, 
the governor of Kaluga Oblast and deputies for 
Khakassia, Novosibirsk Oblast and Sakhalin are 
among those who have demanded more fair 
principles of tax revenue distribution (the latter 
ones were backed by the governor of the region 
nominated in 2015 who managed to negotiate 
some concessions from the Kremlin). Sometimes 
regional parliaments openly threaten that there 
will not be sufficient funds for projects of impor-
tance in the period preceding the election (the 
so-called Putin’s ‘May decrees’15 or road repairs). 
The situation has been worsened by moves from 
federal bodies which contradict the logic of sta-
bilising the situation ahead of the election, for 
example, inflaming the relations with Tatarstan 
or the Komi Republic over language issues16. 
This raises doubts regarding the possibility of 
a durable stabilisation of the situation in the 
‘problematic’ regions and even the smooth organ-
isation of the presidential election; this concerns 
15 Populist decrees passed by Vladimir Putin in May 2012 
(on the occasion of opening his new term as president) 
ordering the regions to significantly raise wages in the 
budget sector (the regions had to incur 70% of the ex-
penses towards this). 
16 In summer 2017, the Kremlin refused to renew the agree-
ment granting special symbolic status to the Republic 
of Tatarstan (including the right to call the head of the 
region its president). This was followed by a dispute as 
to whether the Tatar language lessons should be com-
pulsory or extracurricular (the constitution of the region 
grants it the status of a second state language). The re-
public head, Rustam Minnikhanov, resorted to thinly 
veiled threats addressed to the Kremlin, pointing out that 
Putin’s popularity in the republic may be reduced as a re-
sult of the dispute and that the conflict may cause diffi-
culties in the process of holding the presidential election 
in March 2018, https://www.idelreal.org/a/rustam-min-
nikhanov-tatarskiy-yazik/28816845.html
particularly those governors who do not originate 
from the region and have no knowledge of the 
local problems or mechanisms of regional gov-
ernance (some of the newly nominated governors 
are relatively young former high-ranking officials 
on the federal level). They may find bringing local 
groups of influence under control to be a serious 
challenge. Many of these groups are formed by 
experienced and seasoned political players. In this 
context, the situation of the newly nominated 
governors is difficult because their responsibility 
for stabilising the regional socio-economic situa-
tion is incommensurate to the instruments they 
have at their disposal, and the lack of a strong 
political base in the region puts their personal 
security at risk, above all in connection with the 
possible pressure from law enforcement struc-
tures as part of ‘combating corruption’17. The final 
outcome of the struggle to control the situation 
in the pre-election period will be the sum of the 
repressive and persuasive methods applied and, 
above all, of the individual skills of the new heads 
of the regions. This is why at least some of them 
may finally turn out to be temporary figures who 
will be removed by the Kremlin from their posi-
tions already during the next regional elections 
scheduled for September 2018.
17 The so-called ‘struggle with corruption’ has been inten-
sifying over the past few years in Russia. Governors and 
their inner circles are increasingly often falling victim to 
this struggle. Arrests on charges of corruption or abuse of 
power are most often a result of the struggle for political 
and material assets in which the law enforcement struc-
tures are employed, as well as a means used by the cen-
tre of the federation to discipline members of the elite. 
In 2016 - 2017, criminal investigations were launched 
against 2% of the total number of representatives of the 
regional elites; https://www.rbc.ru/politics/31/10/2017/
59f7a4329a79476ddc21a2df
